Capital Structure and Corporate Decision Making: The Role of Compensation Plans on Managerial Decisions in Relation to Stock Performance in the Financial Markets
This dissertation attempts to answer the research question as to whether compensation plans provide better incentives for managers to take risks and increase stock performance in financial markets by corporations. Objectives aimed at examining whether compensation plans influenced managerial decisions and overall future stock performance in corporations. Another objective assessed effectiveness of compensation plans towards managerial risky decisions and performance. The author’s central argument was that compensation arrangements and efficient market information functionality motivated managerial decisions that increased future stock performance in corporations. The research methods adopted comprised of qualitative research methods that linked past evidence, theories and research works by other scholars to reaffirm or refute previous theories.
The methodology maintained an empiricist paradigm and research that made sense through objectivity realised from collected data. The models sought explanations and predictions with an aim of confirming, or substantiating relationships, as well as assembling generalisations on theoretical frameworks. Qualitatively, trends, gaps and opportunities were critically examined using desktop appraisal of secondary literature, documents, journals, books and reports. Content analysis method detailed systematic assessment of substances in specific materials aimed at identifying patterns, themes, or biases.
The review finds consistent literature to demonstrate that indeed compensation arrangements contribute to performance by managers. Organizations that link compensation plans with individuals could attract egoistic kind of CEO. Extrinsic incentives, particularly money, correlated with the largest productivity in terms of stock performances. Skills-based compensation plan now forms the new trend when identifying potential CEOs. Additionally, when designing compensation arrangements, one should balance with conflicting objectives by the shareholders, executives and corporations. What worked for firm A cannot be assumed to work for firm B because each corporation is distinct in size, philosophy, values and objectives.
- To examine whether compensation plans influence managerial decisions and overall stock performance in corporations
- To assess effectiveness of compensation plans towards managerial risky decisions and performance
1 – Introduction
Statement of the Problem
2 – Literature Review
Does Compensation Plan and Risky Decision Taking Translate to Better Performance?
The Role of Financial Markets in Managerial Decision Making
Forms of Compensation Plans
Effectiveness of Compensation Plans, Risky Managerial Decisions and Performance
3 – Research Methodology
4 – Research Findings
The Hard Facts
Why Compensation arrangements and Performance Metrics?
Short and Long-term Bonus Measures
Human Resource Methods
The Bogey Plan
Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE)
Informational Function of Managerial Decision Making by Financial Markets
The Correlation between Compensation Plans, Risky Decision Making and Performance
Reasons for compensation plans
Reasons against compensation plans
Compensation arrangements and its Effectiveness towards Performance
5 – Analysis and Discussion
6 – Conclusions
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